

2003

# **The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to The Army**

## **PURPOSE**

OS-1. This is the Army Training and Leader Development Panel's (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to The Army of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This report applies primarily to commissioned officers. Subsequent Panel efforts will address noncommissioned officers, and warrant officers.

## **BACKGROUND**

OS-2. The Army is addressing Doctrine, Organization, and Materiel in its Transformation Campaign Plan. It is finalizing FM 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-0 (100-5), *Operations*. It is fielding the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) while developing the Organizational and Operational Concepts (O&O) for the Interim Division (IDIV) and the Objective Force. Work progresses in fielding the Future Combat System. With Doctrine, Organization, and Materiel initiatives well underway, the Chief of Staff, Army, (CSA) chartered the Panel to look specifically at training and leader development, part of Line of Operation 5 of the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan.

OS-3. The Army Vision of being more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the operational spectrum has three component parts: Readiness, Transformation, and People. The Panel's initial mission analysis and planning focused on Transformation and contributing to the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. However, as the Panel began contacting soldiers in the field it became apparent that its mission was principally about people. Soldiers and their families are the Army's center of gravity, and as such, they became the focus of the Panel's effort. The Panel assessed Army training and leader development doctrine and practices to determine their applicability and suitability for the Interim Force. The Panel also worked to determine the characteristics and skills required of Information Age Army leaders who must conduct strategically responsive operations in tomorrow's full spectrum battlespace.

OS-4. The Panel's work provides compelling evidence that a main effort in Army Transformation should be to link training and leader development to prepare Army leaders for full spectrum operations. Linking these two imperatives commits the Army to training soldiers and growing them into leaders. This report, then, is about the Army's people, their beliefs, and the systems that sustain their commitment to the institution. It is also about the practices that dilute their efforts and detract from their remarkable, selfless, and honorable service to the Nation.

## **WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US**

OS-5. The soldiers interviewed in the field transmitted their thoughts in clear text and with passion. They communicated the same passion and dedication for selfless service to the Nation and the Army as any generation before them. Pride in the Army, service to the Nation, camaraderie, and Army values continue to strongly influence the decisions of officers and their spouses to make the Army a career. However, they see Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs. Below is a summation of what they said:

- While fully recognizing the requirements associated with a career in the Army, officers consistently made comments that indicate the Army Culture is out of balance and outside their Band of Tolerance. They cited the following examples:
  - There is an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life. Officers characterize it as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments and exercises, trying to do too much with available resources, too many non-mission and late taskings, too many directed training events, and senior leader "can do" attitudes that put too much on the plate. This impacts predictability in their professional and personal lives and the lives of their families.
  - The Army expects more commitment from officers and their families than it currently provides.

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- The Army is not meeting the expectations of officer cohorts. Junior officers are not receiving adequate leader development experiences. Many captains and majors do not perceive a reasonable assurance of a future because of the Army's CGSOC selection policy. Many retirement eligible lieutenant colonels and colonels do not feel valued for their experience and expertise.
- Top-down training directives and strategies combined with brief leader development experiences for junior officers leads to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive. They do not believe they are being afforded sufficient opportunity to learn from the results of their own decisions and actions.
- There is diminishing, direct contact between seniors and subordinates. This is evidenced by unit leaders who are often not the primary trainers, leaders who are often not present during training, leaders who are focused up rather than down, and leaders who are unwilling to turn down excessive and late taskings. This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust.
- Most officers have not fully embraced the current officer efficiency report. They do not like the term center of mass, forced distribution, and senior rater profile management strategies.
- In the area of leader development, the field raised the following issues:
  - Personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences.
  - Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for success in full spectrum operations.
- In the area of training, officers said:
  - The CTCs are a great training and leader development experience, one the Army must sustain.
  - Army training doctrine is fundamentally sound, but must be adapted to reflect the operational environment and the tools required to train in that environment.
  - Units cannot execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine because of the undisciplined application of that doctrine, resource shortages, and limited training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).

## **PANEL DISCUSSIONS**

OS-6. The Panel's discussions were critical in framing the results of Study Group efforts and synthesizing their findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the tactical to the operational and strategic levels. The Panel supports Study Group major findings in the areas of Army Culture, the OES, Army training, the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), and the link between training and leader development. The Panel investigated two other key areas—

- First, the Panel looked at how the Army develops its current leader competencies for its leaders and units to operate in the operational environment envisioned for the Objective Force. The Panel defined competency as an underlying characteristic related to effective or superior performance. Competencies provide a common language to discuss leader and unit performance, and leader selection, development, and advancement. This common language enables the Army to assess leadership and units, and feedback the results into its training and leader development programs. Competencies also provide a roadmap, enabling leaders and units to know what they have to accomplish.
- The Panel found that the Army's current leadership doctrine uses two methods to develop leader competencies—values-based and research-based. The Army's values-based leader competencies are irrefutable, even if the environment changes. They are at the heart and soul of the soldier's profession. They are the foundation on which all other leader competencies are based. The research method examines the performance of successful leaders, systematically analyzing their behavior and validating them as consistent with superior performers to derive the remaining skills, knowledge, and attributes. These research-based competencies can change over time as the environment changes. As the Army undergoes Transformation, it is using a third method (strategy-based) for developing leader competencies driven by


the Army's strategic direction. The strategy-based method enables the Army to position itself and its leadership for the future, even when that future is uncertain.

- The Army depends on leaders and units that have the requisite leader competencies to execute full spectrum operations. They must thrive in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations. They require competencies that are matched to those new operating conditions and that support the requirement for lifelong learning, which emphasizes the leadership skills and attributes to help the leader and unit—
  - Become aware of the need for new competencies in rapidly changing environments.
  - Know how to develop those new competencies.
  - Transfer that learning and associated competencies to other leaders and units.
  - Institutionalize learning in the Army's culture and systems to increase self-awareness and adaptability.
- The Panel concluded that given the ambiguous nature of the Objective Force's operational environment, Army leaders should focus on developing the "enduring competencies" of self-awareness and adaptability. In this context, self-awareness is the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment; assess against that environment to determine what is new and what to learn to be effective; and the learning process that follows...all to standard and with feedback. Self-awareness and adaptability are symbiotic; one without the other is useless. Self-awareness without adaptability is a leader who cannot learn to accept change and modify behavior brought about by changes to his environment. Adaptability without self-awareness is irrationally changing for change sake, not understanding the relationship between abilities, duties, and the environment. Because these two competencies are so important, the Panel describes them as metacompetencies. They enable lifelong learning and their mastery leads to success in using many other skills required in full spectrum operations. The operational environment requires lifelong learning by Army officers and units that have ingrained the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability as the most important skills and characteristics requisite for mission success in the Objective Force.
- The Panel concluded that the Army must use all three strategies to harness the potential of its leaders. The values-based method provides the foundation for leader competencies. The research-based method provides successful leader competencies of leaders past and present. The strategy-based method enables lifelong learning through the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability for an uncertain and constantly changing environment.
- Second, the Panel concluded that to be an efficient learning organization, the Army must have standards and effective assessment, evaluation, and feedback systems for leaders, units, and itself. While the after-action review (AAR) process is a time-tested and proven system for units, there appears to be no approved feedback mechanism for individual leaders. Additionally, the Army lacks an institutional mechanism that provides an assessment, evaluation, and feedback on the status of its training and leader development programs.

## METHODOLOGY

OS-7. The CSA directed the Panel to focus initially on commissioned officers and to plan for similar, follow-on studies of noncommissioned officers and warrant officers.

OS-8. The Panel task organized four Study Groups, an Integration Team, and a Red Team from its members. Three Study Groups assessed the unit, institution, and self-development pillars of the Army's current Leader Development Model. A fourth Study Group examined Army Culture as it relates to officer development, service ethic, and retention. Senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian subject matter experts from industry and academia provided the Study Groups and the Study Director with expert advice and direction. The Panel's analytic process was thorough, and concentrated on specified and implied tasks directed by the CSA and the Panel's Executive Agent, the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command. The Study Groups used comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research to compile data for analysis. They traveled around the world conducting surveys and interviews with more than 13,500 leaders and spouses around the Army.




OS-9. The Panel convened on 12 June 2000. The Panel conducted a mission analysis and literature review to prepare for conducting field interviews and surveys. Following the fieldwork, the Panel conducted an analysis of the information collected, determined conclusions, and made recommendations. The Panel provided the CG, TRADOC, and the CSA with in-process reviews at regular intervals. The Study Director conducted an initial outbrief to the CSA in Washington, D.C. on 10 October 2000, followed by briefings to Army General Officers throughout October, November, and December.

## RESEARCH DEMOGRAPHICS


OS-10. The Panel contacted approximately 13,500 soldiers in 61 locations worldwide from all cohorts, components, and major commands using surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research. These research demographics provided extensive and credible sampling data to determine findings, develop conclusions, and make recommendations.

OS-11. Nearly 13.5% (9,000+) of active component officers and 1,058 reserve component personnel were interviewed or surveyed. Contacts included personnel committed to the Army as a career, those undecided, and those considering leaving the Army, resulting in a full range of opinions on all issues. The charts below show the breakout of the comprehensive surveys and focus group interviews. They also show the distribution between genders, rank, type of unit (TOE and TDA), and the distribution among the combat, combat support, and combat service support officers. Commissioned




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officers comprised 76% of the research sample, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 21%, and warrant officers (WOs) 3%. Army General Officers (GOs) also participated in the study through interviews and surveys.



The sampling data demographics of gender, race, and rank reflect Army demographics.




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## STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

OS-12. Since 1988, the Army's operational doctrine has evolved from AirLand Battle, to War and Military Operations Other Than War, to contemporary full spectrum operations. The Army's training doctrine—FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*—is separate and distinct from its leader development doctrine, FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*. The Army cannot continue the practice of maintaining training and leader development as separate and distinct imperatives.

OS-13. The Army depends on self-aware and adaptive leaders who have the requisite technical and tactical competence and leader skills to execute full spectrum operations. Those leaders must thrive in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations. From the Army's perspective, no clear-cut line distinguishes "war" and "operations other than war." Stability operations may explode into firefights without warning, requiring Army forces to interact with local populations and displaced persons while in the midst of decisive operations. The dominance of Army forces in high-intensity, open maneuver compels adversaries to attack asymmetrically, exploiting physical and mental vulnerabilities. At the same time, Army forces must retain the ability to close with and destroy the well-equipped and motivated enemy who refuses to yield vital terrain and facilities, with each operation being conducted under the close scrutiny of the media. Technology will not provide convenient solutions to these challenges.




OS-14. Today's Operational Environment is not new. It has evolved since 1989 with the fall of the Iron Curtain and breakup of the Warsaw Pact. The Army has recognized for a decade the need to change to remain relevant to the strategic environment. Left to its own devices, the Army has been slow to adapt. Today, it continues to fall behind in adapting training and leader development programs. The Operational Environment has changed faster than the Army has adapted its training and leader development programs. Consequently, these programs must change quickly to become relevant. The Panel found significant evidence that current programs and resourcing are not working. They reflect neither what it takes to train and grow today's leaders nor the pervasive impact of Army Culture on training and leader development. They also do not reflect the significance of being a learning organization and of learning from educational and operational experiences using uniform, published standards for soldiers, leaders, and units. Training standards for legacy forces are outdated. They do not exist for, or lag behind the fielding of, new organizations. Yet these standards are the basis for assessment and feedback to leaders, units, and the Army. The educational experience is not providing officers the skill sets they need to operate successfully. The Army is not executing its training doctrine. Units cannot train to standard in accordance with Army doctrine because of an undisciplined application of that doctrine, resource shortages, and limited TADSS.

OS-15. The Army has no model reflecting how it thinks about training and leader development. It has no decision management process to assess the components of its training and leader development. The Army is at a strategic decision point for training and leader development. There are two possible courses of action—

- Maintain the status quo by investing in existing systems, models and procedures.
- Establish new systems, models, and procedures from the best of existing programs to develop leaders for full spectrum operations.

The latter course of action is the better way, but it will take leader resolve, focus, and resources to implement.



OS-16. To move ahead, the Army must be willing to challenge everything from FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*; to OERs; to OPMS XXI; to unit status reporting; to the way the Army designs forces, assigns operational missions, and allocates resources. This requires extensive work, but Army leaders are equal to the task.

OS-17. Many of the tools that served the Army well during the Cold War are no longer adequate. The Army must adapt OES curricula to prepare for a new operating environment characterized by regional threats, full spectrum operations, and Information Age technology. To prepare for the noncontiguous, nonlinear battlefields facing the Army during Transformation and beyond, all leaders must be warfighters first. They must be competent in conducting combined arms operations and bonded to the Army before, and as a higher priority than, to their branch. They must be cohesive as a year group and as an officer cohort, self-aware and adaptive, and committed to lifelong learning. A restructured OES can provide these opportunities. Renewed emphasis on home station training to standard, recapitalizing/modernizing CTCs, and investing in TADSS round out the Army's new strategic opportunities. The Army must base both OES and training programs on the SAT, with well-defined and measurable standards.

## STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


OS-18. The Panel compiled and analyzed data from more than 13,500 leaders, using comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research. This work led to a number of strategic conclusions. An outline and summary of the strategic conclusions and recommendations follows.

Army Culture	OES	Training	SAT	Training and Leader Development
Service Ethic	Quality & Relevance	Training Doctrine	Training and Educational Products	Skills and Characteristics
Families	Faculty	Home Station Training	Support Structure	Proponency
Operational Pace	Accreditation	Training Aids, Devices, Simulations, and Simulators		Lifelong Learning
Retention	Joint Professional Military Education	Combat Training Centers		Officer Standards
Micromanagement				Self-Development
OER				Distance Learning
Officer Personnel Management				Training and Leader Development Model
Mentoring				Management Process

## ARMY CULTURE

OS-19. Army Culture is out of balance. There is friction between Army beliefs and practices. Over time, that friction threatens readiness. Training is not done to standard, leader development is limited and does not meet officer expectations, and officers and their families elect to leave the service early. Army Culture is healthy when there is demonstrated trust that stated beliefs equate to actual practices. Such a balance is vital to the health of the profession of arms and to the Nation it serves. Officers understand that there always exists a level of imperfection caused by normal friction between beliefs and practices. This is the Band of Tolerance.

However, officers expressed the strong and passionate feeling that Army Culture is outside this Band of Tolerance and should be addressed immediately. The Army must narrow the gap between beliefs and practices. It must gain and sustain itself within the Band of Tolerance.



OS-20. The first step in improving training and leader development is to recognize that the Army Culture has a direct impact on both of them. In re-establishing balance, leaders must clearly understand that Army Culture is an interwoven mixture of interdependent systems characterized by beliefs and practices. Changes in one system have second and third-order effects on other systems and, ultimately, on how balance is achieved and maintained.

## ARMY CULTURE CONCLUSIONS

OS-21. The Panel reached conclusions on the following aspects of Army Culture: the Army Service Ethic, operational pace, retention, micromanagement, the Officer Evaluation Report, personnel management versus leader development, and mentoring.

### THE ARMY SERVICE ETHIC

OS-22. The field demonstrated strong support for the underpinnings of an Army Service Ethic: pride in their profession, commitment to the Army and its values, belief in the essential purposes of the military, and patriotism. However, the Army's Service Ethic and concepts of Officership are neither well-understood nor clearly defined. They are also not adequately reinforced throughout an officer's career.

### OPERATIONAL PACE

OS-23. Excessive operational pace is a major source of the degradation in the quality of training and leader development. It reduces the quality of operational and educational experiences adversely affecting leader development. It is detrimental to readiness, leader development, and officer job satisfaction; leads to micromanagement; and is a major reason for attrition among all cohorts.




### RETENTION

OS-24. Retention is a significant issue across three officer cohorts (lieutenants, captains and majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels). This is a result of a perceived lack of commitment from the Army, limitations on spouse employment, a perceived imbalance between Army expectations and the family, the lack of work predictability, and only limited control over assignments. An excessive operational pace, unmet leader development



expectations, and Army family considerations are major influences on career decisions. Officers do not perceive a commensurate commitment from the Army to them and their families, despite their belief that the Army expects a high degree of commitment from them. Officers want predictability, stability, and more control over their assignments. Officer spouse comments were consistent with those of their husband/wife. Spouses expressed the same commitment to an Army Service Ethic as their husband/wife.

### Retention Issues

		
Not meeting junior officers' expectations to lead soldiers.	Do not perceive reasonable assurance of a successful career.	Do not feel valued for their experience and expertise. Need stability for their families.

### MICROMANAGEMENT

OS-25. Micromanagement has become part of the Army Culture. There is a growing perception that lack of trust stems from the leader's desire to be invulnerable to criticism and blocks the opportunity for subordinates to learn through leadership experience. This climate is in part a direct result of the rank imbalance at company grade level. Many officers have not been properly developed at their current level or position before they are moved to a higher position for which they have been neither educated nor trained. Inexperienced officers, a high operational pace, and associated high standards of achievement encourage senior officers to be more directive in their leadership and less tolerant of mistakes. These practices impact directly on retention and leader development.

### THE OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

OS-26. The OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety. The OER has two fundamental purposes: provide for leader development, and support personnel management. The OER is not yet meeting officer expectations as a leader development tool. The leader development aspects of the OER are seldom used, and senior raters seldom counsel subordinates.

OS-27. Selection boards clearly indicate that the OER is giving them what they need to sort through a very high quality officer population and select those with the greatest potential to lead soldiers. They are confident that the trend for selection will continue with even better results as the OER matures. However, despite recent high promotion rates (98% to captain and 92% to major) and three years experience with the current OER, there is considerable anxiety in the force over the evaluation system. Field feedback indicates that officers are concerned about the impact of a center of mass rating on career progression. Officers believe the forced distribution system causes senior raters to pool officers and rate by position. They see the term "center of mass" as negative and believe that a center of mass OER in a branch-qualifying position is career ending. Many junior officers simply do not trust the system or what their leaders are telling them about the OER.

### PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT VERSUS LEADER DEVELOPMENT

OS-28. Assignment requirements, instead of individual leader development needs, drive officer personnel management. DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, focuses on career gates rather than the quality of developmental experiences. Assignment officers make assignments based on quotas to fill spaces rather than leader development. The Army assignments system is driven by requirements to fill spaces rather than quality leader development. Officers and field commanders have little say in the current process.

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## MENTORING

OS-29. Officers believe mentoring is important for both personal and professional development, yet a majority of officers report not having mentors. The Army's mentoring definition and doctrine need revising. Officers would like to see a greater emphasis on mentoring, but do not want formal, directed programs.

## ARMY CULTURE RECOMMENDATIONS


OS-30. Capitalize on the strong commitment of Army officers and their spouses for service to the Nation and the Army. Define and teach an Army Service Ethic and Officership throughout OES from Officer Basic Course (OBC) through the War College, with special emphasis in the OBC and Captains Career Course (CCC). Focus on officers' personal and professional expectations from their experiences, and contribute to a common Army understanding of what it means to serve.

OS-31. Conduct a complete review of all Army systems to determine which ones demonstrate that the Army is not equally committed to its soldiers—either in actuality or perceptions—and develop an action plan to attack these issues.

OS-32. Reduce the operational pace, which helps address micromanagement and facilitates establishing the conditions for effective leader development. Incorporate the following requirements into the CSA's DA Training Guidance and AR 350-1—

- Re-establish discipline in the training management process by locking-in training schedules in accordance with published Army doctrine. This assists in protecting quality time for soldiers and their families in unit assignments and protects weekends and planned holidays from routine garrison training activities for the active component force.
- Eliminate nonmission-related compliance training in AR 350-41, *Training in Units*, and other DA- and MACOM-level documents.
- Protect weekends from routine garrison training and staff activities in active component TOE and TDA units, and MACOM and Army staffs. Require the first General Officer in the chain of command to approve exceptions.
- Schedule four-day weekends in conjunction with national holidays to demonstrate through policy the Army's commitment to quality family time.
- Establish DA and MACOM policies and procedures that vest validation of internal and external taskers to subordinate commands in one staff agency. Ensure taskers are valid within the unit's capabilities and prescribed notification times to enforce adherence to the Army training management process.

OS-33. Address officer retention in the three cohorts—



OS-34. Continue to work Well Being Task Force and Army Family Action Plan issues to restore the officers' trust that the Army is committed to them and their families. Proactively and frequently communicate to the field the Army's efforts to improve these quality of life areas.

OS-35. Conduct a review of the OER this year to examine its leader development aspects, the terms "above center of mass" and "center of mass," and the counseling and forced distribution requirements. Involve the field in the review. Find effective (multiple, iterative, active) ways of communicating with the Army about selection rates of officers with center of mass ratings for CGSOC, major, lieutenant colonel, battalion and brigade command, and colonel. Reinforce the leader development aspects of the OER to increase communications between junior and senior officers.

OS-36. Revise DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, to focus on growing leaders and providing quality educational and operational experiences rather than time-driven, check-the-block career mapping. Revise the assignment process to give the chain of command more influence on when to reassign junior officers. Permit the chain of command to retain junior officers in critical developmental jobs until they gain quality leader experiences or prove they are not able to meet the standard. Align captain requirements with authorizations. Review captain positions for conversion to lieutenant. Review the use of senior NCOs and Warrant Officers as Limited Duty Officers to fill captain staff positions or nominative assignments. Validate requirements based on DA FY 01 authorized end strength and priorities. Provide lieutenants serving in captain staff positions the standards for those positions, tools to assess their knowledge and a reachback capability to the institution where they can receive the educational experience needed by distance or distributed learning. Establish qualitative standards for branch qualification at lieutenant, captain, and major based on operational experiences, not just on the number of months assigned.

OS-37. Develop doctrine for mentoring in FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*. Teach it throughout OES, so junior officers understand what mentoring is and how they should be mentored, and field grade officers understand how they should be mentoring junior officers. Place emphasis in Pre-Command Courses so future battalion and brigade commanders understand Army doctrine, their role in mentoring, and the expectations of officers they will mentor.

## OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

OS-38. Over the past ten years the Army's institutional training and education system has attempted to remain relevant to the Operational Environment. But the basic structure and methods within the OES have not appreciably changed. OES also suffers from a lack of resources to provide quality educational experiences. OES must adapt to meet the emerging requirements of full spectrum operations and the transforming Army. It must develop standards and expectations for each course, assess performance against the standards, and provide feedback.

## OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM CONCLUSIONS

OS-39. The quality and relevance of OES instruction from OBC through CGSOC does not meet the expectations of many officers. The OES sufficiently teaches branch technical and tactical skills, but combat support and combat service support officers are not adequately taught the basic combat skills necessary to lead and protect their units in full spectrum operations. OES does not satisfactorily train officers in combined arms skills or support the bonding, cohesion, and rapid teaming required in full spectrum operations. With the increasing emphasis the Army places on battle command in war, it must add stability operations, and support operations to OES. The increasing importance of self-aware and adaptive leaders in full spectrum operations requires OES to educate officers on these qualities. The Army misses shared training opportunities in education because the Officer, Noncommissioned Officer, and Warrant Officer Education Systems are stovepiped and not interrelated. The Army's most experienced instructors teach the most experienced students (e.g., Senior Service College) while less experienced instructors teach the least experienced students (e.g., OBC). OES lacks the

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courses required to teach officers the skills they require in many of the OPMS XXI functional areas, and does not adequately teach digital operations.

**OS-40. OES Linkage.** The Army must link OES from OBC through Senior Service College (SSC), and inculcate Army Culture, Service Ethic, Commitment, Officership, and Warrior Ethos.

**OS-41. Shared Training.** The Army misses out on shared training. The Army's traditional teaching methodology does not adequately prepare lieutenants to work with platoon sergeants and captains when they initially arrive at their first unit. Significant leadership experiences in NCOES, OBC, and CCC are usually conducted in peer groups. Officers and NCOs come to TRADOC schools expecting to learn how to lead and win in combat. Instead, they often sit in classes where their time is crammed with knowledge-level, classroom instruction in weapons and tactics. Knowledge-level (low level of learning) instruction is required, but this instruction alone cannot grow self-aware and adaptive leaders. The Army must develop battle-focused, execution-based education and training to complement the small group instruction methodology for learning.

**OS-42. CGSOC Selection Policy.** Current CGSOC selection policy makes education a discriminator, particularly for the 50% of officers who do not receive resident education to prepare them for their duties and responsibilities. OPMS XXI and full spectrum operations demand that all officers receive the benefit of an Intermediate Level Educational (ILE) opportunity to develop their talent for their next ten years of service.

**OS-43. OES Accreditation.** There is no comprehensive Army OES accreditation process to measure—

- Faculty—Verification of selecting, assigning, and certifying.
- Curricula—Assessment to ensure attaining of curricula purpose and end states, updating curricula, and OES/NCOES/WOES synchronization.
- Facilities—Assessment of physical plant, infrastructure, training areas, and improved simulations to simulate the Operational Environment in conjunction with resident live, virtual, and constructive training in accordance with established standards.
- Students—Assess diagnostic and post-instructional exams, remedial training, and 360-degree assessments.

**OS-44. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).** Army officers graduating from JPME II and serving in joint billets agree the education effectively prepared them for joint and multinational assignments. They believe attendance at JPME II is important for their job success, but throughput at the Armed Forces Staff College limits the numbers that can attend. Officers who had to wait one or more years, or who did not attend JPME II while assigned in a joint billet felt strongly that JPME II would have significantly improved their initial performance. JCS J7 Military Education Division indicates there is a JPME II training backlog of 2,500 officers for 9,066 joint positions because the Armed Forces Staff College only conducts three courses per year with 300 students each session.

## **OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS**

**OS-45.** Develop an OES model for full spectrum operations that links OES from OBC through SSC and teaches the Army Service Ethic, particularly in the OBC and CCC. This OES model transforms OBC, CCC, and CGSOC/Intermediate Level Education (ILE). The revised OES produces bonding, rapid team building, cohesion, and trust in cohorts, functional area expertise for OPMS XXI leaders, and leaders who are adept at digital operations. Specific course objectives are—

- OBC—Develop and implement a new two-phased OBC for lieutenants.
  - First phase is an initial entry course that provides basic small unit combat training to all lieutenants at a central location. This course focuses on establishing a common Army standard for small unit fighting and leadership; teaching common platoon leader skills and Officership; providing opportunities for hands-on, performance-oriented field training; and providing opportunities for lieutenants to train with NCOs and captains as part of a combined arms team conducting full spectrum operations.
  - During the second phase of the new OBC, proponent schools provide lieutenants with training on platoon-level, branch-specific technical and tactical skills.

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- The end state of the new OBC—Lieutenants who have a common bond with their combined arms peers, are technically and tactically proficient small unit leaders, and are ready to assume leadership positions in the transforming Army.
- CCC—Develop and implement a new CCC.
  - The new CCC provides combined arms training to all captains. This course focuses on establishing a common Army standard for fighting, leading, and training combined arms units; teaching common company command skills, and Officership; teaching battalion- and brigade-level combined arms battle captain skills; providing opportunities for hands-on, performance-oriented field and simulation training; and providing opportunities for captains to train with lieutenants and NCOs as part of a combined arms team conducting full spectrum operations. The new CCC must also provide captains with training on company-level, branch-specific technical and tactical skills.
  - The end state of the new CCC—Captains ready to be successful company commanders and battle captains who can plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations and training at the company, battalion, and brigade level.
- ILE—Provide all majors with a quality resident ILE based on OPMS XXI, giving them a common core of Army operational instruction and career field, branch, or functional area training tailored to prepare them for their future service in the Army.
  - This is required by the demands of full spectrum operations and OPMS XXI. ILE for all majors meets that requirement by developing the talent in the officer corps and tailoring their education for their 10th through 20th years of service. It also ends education opportunities as a discriminator for branch qualification, promotion, and command selection. With ILE, all majors receive the same common core instruction that “re-greens” them on Army warfighting doctrine. Following the common core, educational opportunities are tailored to the officers’ career field and functional area. Functional area officers in the three nonoperations career fields receive additional functional area specific training, e.g., qualification course, Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS), and Training With Industry (TWI). Operations Career Field (OPCF) officers will attend the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) that will give them a graduate-level education in tactical warfighting and prepare them for combat command.
  - The end state of ILE—Majors with a common warfighting knowledge of division, corps, and joint operations and who possess a better understanding of their career field’s contribution to warfighting. Field grade officers who have the technical, tactical, and leadership skills required to be successful in their career field, branch, and/or functional area.
- Coordinate scheduling of courses in Army Training Resources and Requirements System (ATRRS) to facilitate shared training events between OES, NCOES, and WOES. The goal is to periodically combine lieutenants, warrant officers, and sergeants from ANCOC and BNCOC to train adaptive leadership skills in a realistic unit environment and build self-confidence during the educational experience. This challenges the students by providing them with the kind of leadership experience needed to lead forces after graduation and provides them the educational experience more effective by group interaction.
- Embed digital C2 training in new OES courses. Implement an Institutional Digital Education Plan.
- Change the faculty selection and assignment strategy to ensure the best qualified, most experienced instructors (former battalion commanders) are used throughout OES and focused on providing the least experienced students a quality educational experience.
- Establish a comprehensive Army OES military accreditation process to maintain academic standards over time in four areas; faculty, curricula, facilities, and students.
- Develop a web-based feedback system from Army OES schools to units to maintain relevancy with the field.
- Increase the opportunity for officers to become JPME II certified prior to serving in a joint or combined billet by seeking legislative authority to conduct JPME II at the CGSOC and Army War College.

## **TRAINING**

OS-46. Nonmission taskings, an excessive operational pace, and shortage of training resources make it harder and harder to execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine. Beyond the day-to-day consequences of missed training opportunities, there is a long-term impact on leader development when junior officers become battalion and brigade commanders. Many do not know or understand what right looks like and may not fully understand the principles of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing training and then retraining to standard. The principles and processes of current training doctrine are sound, but the Army must adapt them to the Operational Environment for TOE and TDA units. The same modernization effort driving the Army's Transformation must also drive the development of TADSS. Many units conduct home station training with modernized weapons and command and control systems using TADSS that are outdated and do not adequately model Army system behaviors and characteristics. Many units have weapons and command and control systems with no associated TADSS. A bright spot in training is the operational and leader development experience the CTCs provide to soldiers, their leaders, and units. The Panel found that the Army must sustain the CTCs, but to do so requires their recapitalization and modernization.

## **TRAINING CONCLUSIONS**

### **TRAINING DOCTRINE**

OS-47. Training doctrine requires adapting to accommodate multiple, asymmetric and unpredictable threats, the Operational Environment, full spectrum operations, warfighting, stability operations and support operations, joint and combined operations, and battle staff training. It should include the fundamentally sound principles from current doctrine and the "best practices" in use today, to meet the requirements of the future.

### **HOME STATION TRAINING**

OS-48. Home station training is often not conducted to standard because of an undisciplined application of Army training doctrine exacerbated by an excessive operational pace, resource shortages, and nonmission training requirements.

### **TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS AND SIMULATIONS**

OS-49. TADSS are outdated or nonexistent. Many TADSS do not adequately model the behavior or characteristics of Army systems. The Army often fields new systems without TADSS. There is no live-virtual-constructive training strategy as part of an Army Training Strategy that sets priorities and allocates resources in the Program Objective Memorandum. Leaders lack a clear understanding of the role simulations and simulators could play in their training programs.

### **COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS**

OS-50. Officers widely accept the CTCs for their training and leader development experience. The CTCs require recapitalization and modernization to remain relevant.

## **TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **TRAINING DOCTRINE**

OS-51. Rewrite FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*, to adapt to full spectrum operations. Consider training management tools developed to meet training requirements in today's environment. Link both to operational (FM 3-0, (100-5) *Operations*) and leader development (FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*) doctrine.

## HOME STATION TRAINING

OS-52. Incorporate the following requirements into the CSA's Training Guidance and Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training*—

- Give more training time to company commanders and platoon leaders by providing more discretionary training opportunities. Return to a bottom-up versus top-down approach to training management.
- Develop and establish a set of Army standards that serves as the baseline requirement for stability operations and support operations.
- Train on warfighting METL tasks unless ordered to change to stability operations or support operations tasks by the Corps Commander.
- Direct units to conduct stability operations or support operations training not more than 90 days prior to deployment for active component and 390 days for reserve component forces, and adjust warfighting readiness reporting requirements during this period.
- Require redeployment and reintegration from stability operations or support operations take 270 days for active and reserve component forces and adjust unit readiness reporting during this recovery period.
- Place responsibility for pre- and post-deployment training with MACOM commanders, using their own resources to help reduce the Army's operational pace.
- Direct FORSCOM to conduct stability operations and support operations training using home-station resources, and USAREUR to continue with the CMTC model.

OS-53. Resource base operations to minimize borrowed military manpower.

## TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS AND SIMULATIONS

OS-54. Fund and field training support packages to support warfighting integration as part of each new system fielding. Upgrade TADSS when the operational system is upgraded. Direct Program Managers to enforce fielding of all new systems with their corresponding TADSS.

OS-55. Direct MACOM commanders to develop prioritized requirements for live-virtual-constructive training in their theaters. Synchronize this input into an Army Training Strategy and resource the strategy in the Program Objective Memorandum.

OS-56. Recapitalize legacy system and non-system TADSS to keep pace with force modernization. Do not field systems without associated TADSS. (TADSS must complement system upgrades.)

OS-57. Field the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer family of virtual systems.

OS-58. Field simulation and simulators to enable effective aviation home station and institutional training. These include the Aviation Combat Tactical Trainer, a Tactical Engagement Simulation System (TESS) for the OH-58D, AH-64 Combat Mission Simulator, and UH-60 Flight Simulator.

OS-59. Fund CBS to maintain relevance to the training audience until WARSIM reaches full operational capability. Continue development of WARSIM to meet IOC and FOC schedules. Continue development and fielding of ONESAF to increase simulation training realism and reduce training operational tempo.

OS-60. Continue the investment strategy for MILES 2000 to replace aging MILES I systems.

## COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

OS-61. Recapitalize, modernize, staff, and resource the CTCs to provide full spectrum, multiechelon, combined arms operational and leader development experience in all types of environments, across the full spectrum of conflict.

OS-62. Synchronize fielding of ABCS to the CTCs in the Army Digitization Master Plan to enable effective training of digital units by CTC Operations Groups.

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OS-63. Conduct a review of Operations Group missions; tables of distribution and allowances; organization; equipment; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures at each CTC to validate requirements to continue training the legacy forces while also training the Initial Brigade Combat Team and Interim Division brigades and battalions.

OS-64. Conduct a review of CTC baseline troop lists for each CTC. Determine what the Army can and should OC, starting with division, then corps, and echelons above corps. Resource CTC OC authorizations to fully support revised baseline troop lists.

OS-65. Provide BCTP Operations Groups A and B with additional OCs to cover each of the seven BOS within a brigade HQ during a division WFX to increase assessment and feedback.

### **SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING**

OS-66. The SAT process is fundamentally sound, but not executed well. TRADOC is not providing the Army with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe lack of training development resources. These products are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. The result is a seriously eroded foundation for building solid, standards-based training and leader development programs in the Army.

### **SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING CONCLUSIONS**

OS-67. TRADOC is not updating or developing training and education products fast enough to support legacy and transformation forces.

OS-68. Training expertise has gradually moved over time from the proponent schools and centers to the CTCs.

OS-69. Soldier Training Publications (STP), Mission Training Plans (MTP), and Training Support Products (TSP) that provide the foundation for standards-based training and leader development are not being updated rapidly enough to support Army needs. Many are obsolete or do not exist. The force is evolving faster than the institutional training base can provide up-to-date training and educational products.

- Army of Excellence products—mostly obsolete.
- Limited Conversion Division—do not exist.
- Force XXI products—limited.
- Initial Brigade Combat Team products—in initial development.

OS-70. Other than the TRADOC Common Core, the Army lacks comprehensive officer performance standards (by branch, functional area, and rank) for commissioned officers. The lack of officer standards impacts leader development. Standards are the basis for assessments, feedback, and corrective action. The Army is a standards-based organization, and yet it has little in the way of objective criteria with which to assess officer performance.

### **SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS**

OS-71. Reinforce the importance of standards-based training in accordance with FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 5-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*. Enforce the SAT process in accordance with TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *SysTems Approach to Training: ManagEmEnt, Processes, and Products*.

OS-72. Redesign the SAT development and support structure to leverage the subject matter expertise in the CTCs for training and doctrine development. Reallocate some training developers and doctrine writers and place them OPCON to CTC Operations Group. These training developers and doctrine writers will develop, write, publish, and update training and doctrine while the Operations Groups provide the subject matter experts to review their work. Prioritize efforts and resources. First to IBCT, then to FXXI and LCD, then to AOE legacy forces. Prioritize this effort to publish battalion training products required to support the CSA's directive to conduct an external ARTEP for every divisional battalion in FY 02.



CTC	Publication Responsibility
BCTP	AOE, FXXI Corps and Division, and IDIV.
NTC	AOE (Heavy), FXXI Brigade, and Battalion.
JRTC	AOE (Light), IBCT.
CMTC	Limited Conversion Division, Brigade, Battalion.

OS-73. Leverage experience of Title XI officers and NCOs in developing STP, MTP, and TSP in conjunction with Forces Command (FORSCOM) and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC).

OS-74. Invest in and exploit network technology to develop a more streamlined and effective SAT process where training and doctrine publications are web-based and updated as the lessons learned from the CTCs are validated. Expand the capabilities of the GEN Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library as a web-based SAT resource (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm>).

## TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

OS-75. Army training and leader development programs do not develop self-aware and adaptive leaders. The lack of a single proponent for training and leader development divides attention and resources between these two key programs and results in their competing for resources. The Army's current leader development model is outdated. The Army has no balanced, integrated and progressive training and leader development model that shows how it thinks about training and leader development. It has no process to periodically assess and provide feedback on the components of training and leader development that leads to decisions for establishing priorities and allocating resources to sustain or improve them. The Army, as a learning organization, needs leaders that value lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences rounded out by self-development.

## TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT CONCLUSIONS

### Proponency

OS-76. Currently, the proponency for training and leader development is vested in separate staff elements at DA level. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations is responsible for matters relating to training and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel is responsible for matters relating to leader development. The lack of a single proponent for training and leader development results in unsynchronized policy and resourcing of these two key imperatives. There is no funding line for leader development in the POM and leader development currently tends to compete poorly for funding against other training priorities. If training and leader development are to be fully linked, the responsibility for both should rest with a single proponent on the DA Staff.

### Lifelong Learning

OS-77. Learning organizations support self-awareness and adaptability. Lifelong learning requires standards, tools for assessment, feedback and self-development. Part of Army Culture should be the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning. This is done by balancing educational and operational experiences and by emphasizing self-development to fill the gaps in knowledge that educational and operational experiences do not provide. To be a learning organization, the Army must develop, fund, and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology. This will allow soldiers, leaders, and units to find standards, training and educational publications, assessment and feedback tools, and access to distance and distributed learning programs for self-development and lifelong learning.

OS-78. Self-development enables officers to gain knowledge not learned from educational and operational experiences. Most officers understand the importance and role of self-development in lifelong learning.

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However, Army training and leadership doctrine does not adequately address it, the Army leaders do not emphasize its value, and the Army does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning. Self-development requires feedback on performance from AARs, mentors, counseling, 360-degree feedback, etc. Many perceive self-development merely as a way to cut costs associated with schooling rather than accepting the potential of self-development as a means toward lifelong learning. Self-development should be the foundation of a professional's lifelong learning process by effectively linking operational and educational experiences with the tools to fill knowledge gaps.

OS-79. Distance learning is the technological means to provide self-development tools to the officer corps. It can also be used to distribute educational experiences from the school to the field. The Army has not yet convinced the officer corps of the benefits of distance learning. Officers believe distance learning increases their workload and decreases what little personal time they have. They are concerned that it prevents them from coming together as a cohort, takes away the opportunity to interact with their peers in resident courses, replaces small group instruction, and takes away the respite from the operational pace Army schools provide. Distance learning is acceptable in the field for self-directed self-development.

#### **Training And Leader Development Model**

OS-80. The Panel identified the components of a training and leader development model in this report. They are Army Culture, standards, feedback, experience, education, self-development and training. The model portrays these components and a guiding set of principles with which to train soldiers and grow leaders through training and leader development programs that are inextricably linked. When the model is followed, the product is a self-aware and adaptive leader. The current leader development model does not include training and lacks an assessment and feedback mechanism.

#### **Management Process**

OS-81. The Army has no established mechanism to continually assess and obtain feedback on its training and leader development programs. Instead, it reacts to change by periodically engaging in Armywide reviews of training, education, and leader development. A management process is necessary to assess and obtain feedback on the components of training and leader development programs in the Army. This process should regularly update the CSA on training and leader development issues to obtain decisions and set priorities for allocating resources in the POM.

### **TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Proponency**

OS-82. Establish a single Army proponent for training and leader development to improve the linkage between training and leader development, policy, and resourcing.

#### **Lifelong Learning**

OS-83. Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to foster lifelong learning in the Army through balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.


- Develop, fund, and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology where soldiers, units, and leaders can go to find standards, training and education publications, assessment and feedback tools, and access distance and distributed learning programs for self-development and lifelong learning. Expand, as an example, the capabilities of the GEN Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library.
- Develop, publish in digital form, and maintain commissioned officer performance standards by branch, functional area, and rank. These standards will inform the officer corps about what they should know and provide the basis for personal assessment that leads to self-awareness and adaptability.

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- Prioritize efforts and resources to deliver the most important training and educational publications in the following order: IBCT, Force XXI, Limited Conversion Division (LCD), and Army of Excellence (AOE) units. Accept risk with AOE units.
- Communicate the benefits of distance learning as part of the lifelong learning process. Integrate distance learning in the active component deliberately, building on the distance learning successes of the reserve components. Emphasize the value of lifelong learning.
- Focus distance learning on self-directed, self-development.
- Resource distance learning in the active component to provide reachback capability to lieutenants assigned to fill captain staff positions. This provides lieutenants access to web-based, self-development modules to accelerate and enhance their ability to meet the requirements of these assignments.
- Publish a definition of and doctrine for self-development in FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*, and incorporate in FM 7-0 (FM 25-100), *Training the Force*, FM 7-10 (FM 25-101), *Battle Focused Training*, AR 600-100 *Army Leadership*, AR 600-3 *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, and DA PAM 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*. Teach self-development doctrine, an awareness and understanding of the tools to enable self-development, and the expectation for self-development in OES.
- Provide support to officers pursuing self-development and gradually introduce a 360-degree feedback strategy starting in OES and then expanding to the field.

### Training And Leader Development Model

OS-84. Adopt the Panel's proposed Training and Leader Development model. It is a balanced, integrated, and progressive training and leader development model that assures full spectrum capability. The model shows the components of Army training and leader development programs, the process, and the products that link training and leader development into a single entity. An assessment and feedback process enables the Army to examine the components of its training and leader development processes and determine which must be adjusted, establish priorities, and allocate resources to its training and leader development programs to continue producing self-aware and adaptive leaders and trained and ready units. The model's components are described below.



### Army Culture

OS-85. The Army can have adequate training and leader development programs but if its beliefs and practices are out of balance, leaders leave the Army, rendering training and leader development programs less effective. Officers are firmly and deeply committed to the concept of an Army Service Ethic. They are motivated by service to the country and recognize the essential nature of selfless service as a foundation of the profession. They embrace a Warrior Ethos, the Army Values, and lifelong learning. These cultural issues must remain in balance for the Army to get the greatest return on its investment in training and leader development programs.

### Standards

OS-86. The Panel found that outdated standards for legacy forces, a lack of standards for some units, such as the Limited Conversion Divisions, and a shortage of standards for others, such as FXXI Divisions and Corps inhibits standards-based training and leader development programs for education, unit training, and self-development.

### Feedback

OS-87. The Army's training doctrine has feedback as part of the training management process. Assess training against measurable standards and feed this assessment back into the training program to sustain those tasks trained to standard and improve those where the standard was not met. For units, the AAR process provides this feedback mechanism. For leaders, there is no feedback mechanism and, as the Army demonstrates by its periodic Armywide reviews of training, education, and leader development, it has no mechanism to continually assess, evaluate, and obtain feedback on the status of the components that make up its training and leader development programs. The Army must address leader and Army feedback systems in its model.

### Balancing Field And Institutional Experience

OS-88. A balance between operational and educational experiences provides the best method to train soldiers and grow leaders. These experiences must be synchronized and mutually supporting. Self-development facilitated by distance learning, technology, standards and feedback fills the knowledge gaps between educational and operational experiences. It is the key to lifelong learning.

### Self-development

OS-89. Educational and operational experiences cannot provide officers all the knowledge they need to be self-aware and adaptive leaders. Self-development is essential to lifelong learning and provides the training and education operational and educational experiences cannot supply.

## TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

OS-90. The Army is doctrine based. Through strict adherence to this doctrine, diverse units worldwide can share a common understanding of its application. A key aspect of this doctrine is the principles on which it is founded. Selected enduring principles of FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 226 (22-100), *Army Leadership*, must be interwoven to adapt training and leader development to meet the requirements of full spectrum operations.

- **Mission Focused.** Nonmission requirements impact not only a unit's ability to accomplish training in accordance with the Army's training doctrine but also junior leader development. Resource shortages — time, ranges, people, etc.—also affect the leader's ability to effectively execute unit training. Everything the Army does must be mission focused; to do anything else distracts from mission accomplishment.
- **Doctrinally Based.** Operational, Training, and Leadership doctrine provides a common operating framework and language for soldiers, leaders, and units throughout the Army. They must be adapted to the operating environment and linked to each other.
- **Performance Oriented.** Soldiers learn through doing. Performance-oriented training has the highest knowledge retention rate among the adult learning techniques. Both training and leader development programs must be focused to provide the chances to grow through a balanced approach of operational and institutional hands-on experiences.

- Mission Focused
- Doctrinally Based
- Performance Oriented
- Train as You Fight
- Leader as Primary Trainer
- Know Yourself
- Lifelong Learning
- Mentorship


- **Train as You Fight.** This principle has been validated by the Combat Training centers. Soldiers in operations such as Desert Shield attributed their success in actual combat operations to training for combat through the rigorous operational experience of the CTC.
- **Leaders as Primary Trainers.** Leaders are responsible for planning training, preparing, executing, assessing, and feeding back the results to their units, and soldiers. Their personal participation in each step is essential as they set the azimuth for their units accomplishments to the standards the Army has set. Leaders must be present for training.
- **Know Yourself.** Self-aware and adaptive leaders are the basis for success in full spectrum operations. The relationship between self-awareness and adaptability is symbiotic. The greater self-awareness gained by assessment against measurable standards, the more adaptive the leader. Through a commitment to lifelong learning enabled by self-development, leaders can narrow the knowledge gaps not provided through educational and operational experiences.
- **Lifelong Learning.** Part of the Army's Culture should be the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning. Learning organizations support self-awareness and adaptability. Lifelong learning requires standards, tools for assessment, feedback, and self-development.
- **Mentorship.** Mentoring enables senior leaders to train and educate officers. Mentoring is not a formal program, but part of the stock and trade of the soldier's profession. It focuses on the art of leadership.

OS-91. Trained and ready forces led by self-aware adaptive leaders are the end state of the model. The model combines Army Culture, standards, feedback, and operational and educational experiences through operational assignments, schooling and self-development to achieve that end. The model constantly measures itself against embedded training and leader development principles.

#### ESTABLISH AN ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

OS-92. Establish an Army Training and Leader Development Management Process to—

- Facilitate better assessment and feedback of training and leader development issues and initiatives through the Army's Transformation.
- Brief the CSA regularly on training and leader development issues to obtain decisions, set priorities and allocate resources in the Program Planning, Budget, and Execution System (PPBES).



## IMPERATIVES

OS-93. The Panel identified seven strategic imperatives that are key to success. Each imperative has multiple recommendations. Army leaders must endorse and take action on them if the Army is to make substantial improvement in training and leader development. The seven imperatives are listed below.

OS-94. **Army Culture.** Recognize the strong relationship between Army Culture and the quality of training and leader development programs. Army Culture must operate routinely within an acceptable Band of Tolerance for the Army to effectively train soldiers and grow leaders. Any change that widens the gap between beliefs and practices in the Army Culture impacts the Army's ability to train soldiers and grow leaders.

OS-95. **Officer Education System.** Adapt the OES to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the Operational Environment. Largely untouched since the end of the Cold War and progressively under-resourced during downsizing, the OES is out of synch with Army needs. Adapting the OES requires a new approach that focuses each school on a central task and purpose, links schools horizontally and vertically in the educational process, synchronizes the educational and operational experiences of officers, and educates officers to established, common standards.

OS-96. **Training.** Revitalize the Army training system by updating training doctrine, improving home station training, and modernizing the CTCs. Training doctrine (FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*) must be adapted to account for the Operational Environment and realities and linked to operational (FM 3-0 (100-5), *Operations*) and leadership (FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*) doctrine. In the mean time, commanders and units must adhere to existing training doctrine, principles, and practices to help reduce operational pace. The Army must provide commanders with the necessary resources. This includes increasing the availability and quality of TADSS to support training. Finally, the Army must recapitalize, modernize, staff, and resource the CTCs to provide full spectrum, multiechelon, combined arms operational and leader development experiences.

OS-97. **Systems Approach to Training.** Commit to returning to standards-based training. Standards-based training has been the strength of Army preparedness since the end of the Vietnam War. Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance and providing feedback. Yet, the Systems Approach to Training designed to document and publish those training standards has atrophied. Without common standards, soldier, leader and unit readiness—and battlefield success—are in doubt. These common standards must be documented, accessible, and digital.

OS-98. **Training and Leader Development Model.** Adopt a model that clearly shows how training and leader development are linked. The existing leader development model is inadequate. A new model must clearly communicate the Army leadership's intent and must be understandable for junior leaders, staffs, and outside agencies. The Panel determined that the model must be based on Army Culture; mandate standards for soldiers, leaders, and units; provide feedback to soldiers, leaders, units, and the Army; and balance operational and educational experience through education, assignments, and self-development. The product of the model should be self-aware, adaptive leaders, and trained and ready units. The model is meant to be all encompassing with respect to focusing institutional education, guiding field training and advocating self-development in a lifelong learning paradigm. It should also help the Army develop a mature management process that continually addresses training and leader development issues in a decision making forum for the CSA.

OS-99. **Training and Leader Development Management Process.** Adopt and institute a management process to facilitate managing change. The Army must have a management plan or else risk losing sight of the reasons for change. Today, the Army has no management system for both training and leader development. This management process must be iterative, collaborative, and comprehensive. It must provide issues to the CSA on a recurring basis to measure progress, adjust priorities, and apply resources. Momentum is essential; initially this decision forum should meet quarterly with the CSA to build momentum, interest, and enthusiasm throughout the Army.

OS-100. **Lifelong Learning.** Part of Army Culture is the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development to fill knowledge gaps educational and operational experiences do not provide. To be a learning organization that supports this lifelong learning the Army must—

- Provide the training and educational standards and products that are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development.
- Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to foster life long learning through balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.
- Develop, fund and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology where soldiers, leaders; and units can go to find standards, training and education publications, doctrinal manuals, assessment and feedback tools and can access distance and distributed learning programs for self-development and lifelong learning.
- Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to inculcate the concept and practice of lifelong learning, self-awareness and adaptability in the Army's culture.
- Teach the importance of lifelong learning and the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability throughout OES. Strengthen this approach in organizations and in self-development.

## SUMMARY

OS-101. This report is about the Army's people...the centerpiece of our formations...their beliefs and the systems that sustain their commitment to the service. It is also about the practices that dilute their efforts and detract from their remarkable, selfless, and honorable service to the nation. The Panel was impressed and inspired by the commitment and dedication of the Army's leadership...Sergeant to General...and the extraordinary effort of all involved in this effort. America has a great Army and the Army's people...young and old...want to make it even greater!

## INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

**A. Report Title: The Army Training and Leader Development  
Panel Officer Study Report To The Army**

**B. Report downloaded From the Internet: June 30 2003**

**C. Report's Point of Contact: Department of the Army  
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